16 October 2008

C4ISR and Future Warfare

From the C4ISR Conference in Washington, DC. I'm attending for work, but hoping to offer some comments here throughout the day.
Updates coming throughout the day on this post...



First presentation:
"Adapting Joint Operations to the 21st Century Reality" - LTG Bob Wood
"Must be prepared to deal with a wide variety of complex challenges in peace, crisis, and war anywhere in the world, on short notice, for indeterminate duration, in response to unexpected events.

Nothing really surprising right there, but it sure does focus the attention when it's all written out there, eh?


"We need to get away from set-piece blocking-and-tackling and start paying more attention to the ebb and flow of the complex 'soccer match' of irregular warfare."



5 areas of focus: Land Power, Sea Power, Air Power, Space Power, Cyber Power
Need to connect C2+C2ISR at tactical, operational, strategic levels to aim for 'targets at the edge'.


If I hear "at the edge" one more time, I'm going to scream...


There's a lot of discussion of adaptive planning and opportunistic decision-making. This is antithetical to the existing Army doctrine on the MDMP, which focuses on deliberate steps with a single COA at the end. This is far more similar to the planning process used by the OPFOR at Ft Irwin, where 3-4 COAs are planned, briefed, and rehearsed, and the decision is made on which COA to execute based on enemy actions.


Not "Net-centric warfare" - ie. 'building the perfect network' - but rather "Leader-centric... Net-enabled warfare"


(I will try to post the graphic with this later)
C2ISR capability barely exists at PLT level, and grows as echelons go up to Corps level. However, much of the fight where ISR is needed is at CO/PLT level and information was designed to flow from top down when it's needed from bottom-up.


Biometrics and body language is no longer a useful social skill, but now a necessary tactical task.


At least we're not talking about "to the tactical edge and beyond."


A question was just asked about when "Cyber Power" would be treated as an equal with Land/Sea/Air/Space. I think the real answer to that is that it'll happen when we have a serious fight that we're in danger of losing, and are forced to focus attention rather than assuming dominance in the domain.


Interesting that even while discussing irregular warfare and complex events, there's no discussion on "Information Power" and trying to win the Information/Media war at the same level with Land/Sea/Air/Space/Cyber...


Second Presentation
"Air Force Cyber Command" - A Status Report - Maj. Gen. Dave Senty

USAF apparently wants to work with NGB to create an organization of "cyber Minutemen" who can mobilize and respond instantly cyber attacks and integrate "Title 10 capabilities with Title 32 missions."
Also working on a deal with Georgia Tech to send new Cyber career field officers to GT instead of Air Command & Staff College.
And of course, they've already got a draft of a "cyber operator badge" because, hey, it's the US military - can't have nearly enough chest candy...

I'd've blogged more about that talk, but it was of a snoozer compared to the first one.


Not standing up separate command, but letting it involve.
"Don't create a command and then say 'OK, what do we want it to do?' but figure out what capabilities first, then when they evolve and grow big enough, group those capabilities as a command"



BREAK TIME


Third Presentation
Ronald Jost, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3, Space and Spectrum, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration
Was supposed to be talking about "The Bandwidth Bottleneck" but is instead talking about the GIG and the varying layers of the gig, such as the transport layer, or other layers.
Security in older stovepipe systems was much easier b/c of high walls around the system. New IP-based systems have more distributed security needs and will be more attribute-based and role-based.


Cost of deploying GIG from core to edge (there's that term again) increases approximately 100x. But needed more on edge than at the core. Centralizing IT systems works best for cost control, but lousy for distributing info.


And here's the inevitable SOA slide...


Boy, that was a very hardware-focused talk that would've really ignited the imagination of a few colleagues, but did very little for me...


Next Presentation
USAF MG Kennedy, USJFCOM. Apparently a pilot in Afghanistan, but I heard a side-remark at the table that apparently he was flying Cessnas, rather than strafing Taliban at Tora Bora
C4ISR - A "3D" Approach
3D: Decision-Maker, Decision Cycle, Data Management


Need to focus on interagency architecture and shared systems supporting shared decision-makers.
Lots of agencies, nations, partners, etc.


Bragging about Predator video feed with an airman flying in Nevada, as though fighting the war from home is somehow 'cool.' Count me among the Army guys that doesn't think the USAF really "gets" burden-sharing.


Good to know we're spending millions of dollars every year to keep a fleet up satellites in the air just to provide "Predator P0rn" feeds to every O-4 with a jones for some carnage. Oh, and chat rooms. Glad we've got our chat rooms. Can't run a war without our chat rooms these days. Makes you wonder how we won WWII without them...


While the data-pipe realities of tiny bandwidth at the tactical level are a necessary consideration of creating your networks, when you discuss how to focus the traffic being sent around the network, don't describe "doctrine" as "TTPs". "Doctrine" isn't just a "good idea" - it's required. I guess a USAF guy describing Army doctrine isn't necessarily a recipe for success.


(showing some Pred-P0rn)
Those were two locals identified as insurgents who needed to not be contributing to the insurgency anymore. And thanks to single-digit-minute decisions enabled by the network, those two insurgents are no longer contributing to the insurgency.



LUNCH!
Will return in a new post with more details.

By: Brant

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